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A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE FOR THE 
TRUE CODIFICATION OF PAYMENTS LAW 
PETER A. ALCES* 
INTRODUCTION 
I NCREASED technological sophistication• and evolving financial in-stitution procedures2 have created a gap between commercial practices 
and the codified law of payments. Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) does not contemplate the likes of check truncation,3 access 
* Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; A.B. 1977, Lafayette 
College; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the very 
thorough research and editorial assistance provided by David K. Taylor, J.D. 1984, Uni-
versity of Alabama. 
1. See National Comm'n on Elec. Fund Transfers, EFT in the United States 1 
(1977) ("EFT systems and services represent an alternative that will operate side-by-side 
with the traditional cash and check payment systems.") [hereinafter cited as EFT in the 
U.S.]; N. Penney & D. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems iii (1980) 
(discussing the "technological revolution at work in banking"). 
2. It has been estimated that by 1985 banks will process sb:ty billion checks annu-
ally. See Brennan, Better Resting Place for Bank Clzecks?, ABA [Am. Bankers Ass'n] 
Banking J. 47, 47 (May 1980); see also Leary & High, Tlze Place of EFT and Clzeck 
Truncation in Corporate Payment Systems, 5 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 6 n.31 (1980) (noting that 
one bank processed two billion checks in 1977). Procedures intended to streamline the 
collection process include check truncation, see infra note 3, computer sorting and post-
ing, magnetic encoding of checks, and off-premises data processing centers. See B. Clark, 
The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards~ 10.1 (rev. ed. 1981). For an 
excellent history of the banking industry's response to the technological revolution of the 
past 30 years, seeN. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, ~ 1.01. Of course this has not 
been the first time technological change has affected commercial law. Grant Gilmore 
commented in 1948 that "[t]echno1ogical changes in the methods of production and dis-
tribution of goods have over the last hundred and fifty years rendered the . . . common 
law of sales quaint and archaic." Gilmore, On tlze Difficulties of Codifying Commercial 
Law, 57 Yale L.J. 1341, 1343 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore I]. 
3. Check truncation occurs when a bank retains paper checks rather than returning 
them to the customer. N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, C" 1.01, at 1-13. In this 
process, electronic or computer data are substituted for paper in the processing system. 
(Credit card slips are also often truncated.) In the check truncation system most \\idely 
used today, the drawee bank keeps the check and sends the customer a detailed periodic 
statement. Some drawee banks send their customers an "Account Reconciliation State-
ment," containing a description of each payment-amount, date, check number and a 
special number for retrieval purposes. A copy of the original check is forwarded to the 
customer upon request. Other drawee banks supply their depositors with checkbooks 
that make a carbonless copy of the check as it is written. See id. C" 2.01, at 2-2 to -4. A 
more complex truncation system, within the current technology but not yet fully imple-
mented, is depositary bank retention of checks. After receiving the items, the depositary 
bank microfilms the checks and electronically sends the vital information (amount and 
account number) to the drawee bank. If the drawee bank agrees to pay, settlement is 
made and after a period of time the depositary bank destroys the original check. The use 
of an intermediary bank is eliminated by this procedure. See Arthur D. Little, Inc., The 
Consequences of Electronic Funds Transfer 73 (1975); D. Baker & R. Brandel, The Law 
of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems 1]2.03, at S2-4 (1983 cum. supp. toN. Penney & D. 
Baker, supra note 1); B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 10.6. For a more detailed discussion of 
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devices,4 automated teller machines5 or wire transfers,6 and is therefore 
check truncation, seeN. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, ~~ 2.01-.03; Leary & High, 
supra note 2; White, Legal Guidelines for Check Truncation, 2 Computer L.J. ll5 (1980); 
Note, Alternatives to the Present Check-Collection System, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 575-81 
(1968); Kutler, Truncation's Bark is Worse than its Bite, Am. Banker, Aug. 15, 1980, at 
1, col. 2. 
Because check truncation is a modification of the traditional check system intended to 
increase efficiency, the question arises as to its impact on specific provisions of the UCC. 
Section 4-406, for example, imposes a duty on the customer to exercise "reasonable care 
and promptness to examine the statement and items to discover his unauthorized signa-
ture or any alteration of an item." U.C.C. § 4-406(1) (1977). If the bank establishes that 
the customer breached that duty, the Code may preclude the customer's assertion of 
forgery or alteration against the bank. Under UCC § 4-406(1), the customer has no duty 
to act, however, unless the bank (1) sends the statement and items to him; or (2) "holds 
the statement" pursuant to the customer's request; or (3) "otherwise in a reasonable man· 
ner makes the statement and items available to the customer." Id. There is disagreement 
over whether any of the three tests can be satisfied by truncated statements. Compare N. 
Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, ~ 2.02, at 2-7 to -9 (none of the three tests can be 
satisfied; therefore, the issue turns on the bank's ability to impose a contractual duty on 
customers to report forgeries and alterations) with B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 10.4, at 10-7 
(the "availability test" would cover the case where the drawee bank keeps the checks and 
the customer has knowledge of his right to examine them). 
The Uniform New Payments Code (UNPC), Unif. New Payments Code (Perm. Edito· 
rial Bd. Draft No. 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.N.P.C.], provides a solution. UNPC 
§ 203 requires a customer to "exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine any 
statement furnished or made available . . . and to discover any orders not authorized by 
it or materially altered." U.N.P.C., supra, § 203. The comments following the section 
explain how UNPC § 203 departs from UCC § 4-406: 
First, the general obligation of subsection (1) applies whether or not the 
actual checks are returned to the customer . . . . Second, given the applicabil· 
ity of the Section to all orders, the Section speaks of orders unauthorized by the 
customer rather than unauthorized signatures or alterations. Third, the pro-
posed draft extends the 14 day period now provided in UCC 4-406(2)(b) to 60 
days where written orders or copies are not returned. This follows the 60 day 
period allowed for EFT transactions under § 909(a) of the [Electronic Funds 
Transfer Act]. 
U.N.P.C., supra, § 203 comment 1 on existing law. For a thorough discussion of the 
effect of check truncation on a customer's duty to correct a statement, compare Penney, 
Bank Statements, Cancelled Checks, and Article Four in the Electronic Age, 65 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1341, 1358 (1967) (recognizing problems occasioned by check truncation) with 
Clarke, An Item is an Item is an Item: Article 4 of the UCC and the Electronic Age, 25 
Bus. Law. 109, 109 (1969) (suggesting that UCC Article 4 is responsive and applicable to 
all banking issues presented by new payments systems). 
4. An "access device" is typically a plastic card issued by the financial institution to 
the customer, along with a personal identification number. See Note, EFTS: Consumer 
Protection under the UCC, 10 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 497, 500-01 (1977). The device provides 
access to automated teller machines (ATMs)--customer activated terminals enabling the 
customer to make deposits, obtain cash and initiate payments at all hours. See infra note 
5. The Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982), 
defines the term "accepted card or other means of access" as "a card, code, or other 
means of access to a consumer's account . . . for the purpose of transferring money be· 
tween accounts or obtaining money, property, labor or services." /d. § 1693a. 
5. An automated teller machine is a customer-bank communication terminal 
designed to provide many routine banking services for customers. See Arthur D. Little, 
Inc., supra note 3, at 239; N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, ~ 6.01. Banks place 
ATMs both on and off bank premises. Thus, "[t]he ATM supports both the old and the 
new payment systems. By supplying cash, it aids paper-based systems; by making depos· 
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unresponsive to many issues of increasing concem.7 Moreover, the effi-
cacy of Article 4 answers to commercial paper problems is eroding. For 
example, the Price v. Nea/ 8 rule, which establishes a drawee's liability for 
its, transfers from savings to checking accounts, and payments, AThfs aid in the develop-
ment of [electronic funds transfer] systems." /d. ~ 6.01, at 6-2. For other discussion of 
ATMs, see EFT in the U.S., supra note 1, at 234; Budnitz, Problems of Proof When 
There's a Computer Goof: Consumers Versus ATMs, 2 Computer L.J. 49 (1980); Winter, 
Banking by Blip, 69 A.B.A. J. 263 (1983); Howard, Get Ready for The 'Smart Card', 
Dun's Bus. Month, May 1982, at 88. 
6. A wire transfer system is an electronic transfer of information and money be-
tween financial institutions. It has been estimated that wire transfers account for the 
movement of $117 trillion each year. Arthur D. Little, Inc., Issues and Needs in the 
Nation's Payment System 12, table 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Little Report]. While 
the average check is $570 and average bank card transaction $38, the average wire trans-
fer is $2 million. Id. There are several methods by which wire transfers can originate. 
Transfers can be made by written instructions, repetitively or by customer order to trans-
fer funds to another bank. In addition, banks send wires to the Federal Reserve to re-
plenish their reserve accounts or to other banks to settle interbank obligations. Scott, 
Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 Co1um. L. Rev. 1664, 
1668-69 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Scott I]. The principal wire systems in the United 
States are BankWire II, Cash Wire, CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System), 
S.W.I.F.T. (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), FedWire 
and telex. Id. at 1669. Although all systems provide a communications network, some 
(S.W.I.F.T., BankWire II and telex) leave settlement arrangements to the parties. 
Among the systems that do provide for settlement, two (CHIPS and CashWire) defer 
settlement to the end of a specified period, and in one (FedWire) settlement is instantane-
ous. Two of the systems (FedWire and telex) are not owned by their users and thus the 
users lack rule-making authority over the way the system is governed. The systems "fail 
to provide adequate solutions to the ultimate liability of participants, or their customers, 
for failures to settle obligations, fraud or mistake." Id. (emphasis in original). See gener-
ally EFT in the U.S., supra note 1, at 338-39 (discussing FedWire and BankWire); N. 
Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1,1)1)9.01-.14 (discussing FedWire, Bank Wire II, CHIPS 
and S.W.I.F.T.); Trotter, Is Corporate EFT Coming of Age?, 2 Computer LJ. 87, 93 
(1980) (chart describing various wire transfer systems); Comment, Risk Allocation in In-
ternational Interbank Electronic Fund Transfers: CHIPS & SWIFT, 22 Harv. lnt'l LJ. 
621 (1981) {discussing CHIPS and S.W.I.F.T.). 
7. See Dunne, The Checkless Society and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. Law. 127, 128 
(1968); Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 15 Yale L.J. 788, 791 (1966); Penney, Arti-
cles 4 and 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 La. L. Rev. 259, 259 (1966); Penney, 
supra note 3, at 1367-60. 
The conclusion that Article 4 is inapplicable to evolving payment systems is based 
primarily on the view that a stored electronic payment message does not fit the UCC 
definition of an "item": "any instrument for the payment of money even though it is not 
negotiable but does not include money." U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(g) (1977). Once a check is 
truncated, can the resulting "electronic blip" be categorized as an item? One state has 
amended the UCC definition to include a "stored electronic message unit." Ga. Code 
Ann. § 11-4-104(g) (1982). Article 4 has been held inapplicable to wire transfer systems 
because of the§ 4-104(1)(g) definition of an "item." See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 
673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Delbrueck & Co. v. 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979); Jetton, Evra 
Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp-· Consequential Damages for Bank Negligence in Wire Trans-
fers, 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 369, 398 & n.27 (1983). 
8. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762); see W. Britton, Handbook of the Law of 
Bills and Notes §§ 133-136 (2d ed. 1961). 
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paying over a forged drawer's signature9-at one time a reasoned conclu-
sion consistent with commercial practices-lacks logical foundation in 
this age of computerized check processing. 10 In addition, bank counsel 
are looking for solutions to problems such as the treatment of "through 
us" items, 11 and find none in the Bank Deposits and Collections provi-
9. The Price v. Neal rule is codified in UCC §§ 3-418 ("Finality of Payment or Ac-
ceptance") and 4-207 ("Warranties of Customer and Collecting Bank on Transfer or Pre-
sentment of Items; Time for Claims"). Section 3-417 ("Warranties on Presentment and 
Transfer") provides the same warranties outside the bank check context. The rule is 
predicated on the drawee bank's superior position to detect a forgery because of the 
drawee's supposed knowledge of the customer/drawer's signature, and also on a desire to 
end the transaction on an instrument when it is paid rather than reopen and upset a series 
of commercial transactions at a later date when the forgery is discovered. U.C.C. § 3-418 
official comment 1 (1977). For exhaustive treatment of the rule, see Edwards, Recovery of 
Final Payments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 341 (1979); 
Note, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1891); Note, Finality of Pay-
ment and the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 Temp. L.Q. 182 (1959); Note, Allocation of 
Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 62 Yale L.J. 417 (1953). 
10. See Murray, Price v. Neal in the Electronic Age: An Empirical Study, 87 Banking 
L.J. 686 (1970). The UNPC may sound the death knell for Lord Mansfield's 1762 Price 
v. Neal opinion. Section 204 provides that each customer or transferor of an unauthor-
ized draw order is liable to all transferees who pay on the order in good faith. U.N.P.C., 
supra note 3, § 204(1). The UNPC would abolish Price v. Neal because "the rule has no 
convincing justification and some significant costs in today's high speed check processing 
environment." Id. § 204 comment 2. "[T]he traditional justification that the drawee is in 
a superior position to detect the forgery seems dubious today" in view of computerized 
check processing, which makes it uneconomical to verify all signatures. /d. The "final-
ity" rationale, which imposes liability on the payor bank to avoid reopening the transac-
tion, is no longer relevant "in cases of forged endorsements where warranties are now 
given to the payor bank." Id. The UNPC drafters viewed Price v. Neal "as not giving 
adequate incentives to payees to check on the bona fides of people drawing checks to 
them." /d. Moreover, the rule "makes no sense in cases of check truncation," see supra 
note 3, because "the drawer's signature is not available for inspection by the payor ac-
count institution." U.N.P.C., supra note 4, § 204 comment 2; see B. Clark, supra note 2, 
11 10.6, at 10-15 Gustification that drawee is in superior position to detect forgery is no 
longer applicable when depositary bank retains check). But see The New York Clearing 
House, Statement on the Proposed Uniform New Payments Code 14 (Sept. 29, 1983) 
(elimination of Price v. Neal may make financial institutions more cautious in dealing 
with potential customers) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 
NYCH Statement]. A drawee bank that has paid over a forged drawer's signature may in 
some circumstances proceed against a prior party on a restitution theory. Compare Leary 
& Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good News from Articles Three and Four, 43 Ohio 
St. L.J. 611, 620-24 (1982) (payor bank may have right to recover payment from recipient 
who was neither holder in due course nor person who changed position in good faith 
reliance on payment) and Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 Yale L.J. 228, 
238-39 & n.57 (1982) (same) and Note, Commercial Paper and Forgery: Broader Liability 
for Banks?, 1980 U. Ill. L.F. 813, 836 (same) with J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of 
the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code§ 16-2, at 613-18 (2d ed. 1980) (constru-
ing UCC §§ 4-213 and 4-302 as an "obstacle to the drawee's restitutionary recovery 
[under§] 3-418"). The crux of the issue is clearly presented, if not clearly addressed, in 
First Nat'! City Bank v. Altman, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1966), affd mem., 277 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967). 
11. A "through us" item or "payable through draft," unlike a check, is not drawn on 
the drawer's bank account with a direction to the bank as drawee to pay the item. "In-
stead, it merely designates the bank as a collection agent to present the draft to the 
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sions of the UCC. 
In response to this dearth of statutory guidance, the Permanent Edito-
rial Board12 of the UCC in 1977 directed the 3-4-8 Committee13 to con-
sider modifications and additions to Article 4. The Committee found 
myriad shortcomings in the current law and began drafting a Uniform 
New Payments Code (UNPC) to improve and make consistent existing 
payments law and to provide statutory law where none now exists. 14 In 
drawer-drawee for payment, thus giving the drawer a second look before finally approv-
ing payment through the bank." B. Clark, supra note 2, (j 3.7[2], at 3-43. "Payable 
through" drafts are recognized in UCC § 3-120: "An instrument which states that it is 
'payable through' a bank or the like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make 
presentment but does not of itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument." U.C.C. § 3-
120 (1977). This device is usually used by organizations that wish to give to their cus-
tomers check writing capability without participating in the bank processing system. One 
example would be Merrill Lynch's Cash Management Account. The "drawer" has the 
account with the brokerage firm, not the bank that actually processes the checks. See 
Mittelsteadt, The Stop Payment Right in an Electronic Payment Environment: An Analy-
sis of the Transition Problems Involved when Integrating a Traditional Right into New 
Value Transfer Systems, 17 New Eng. L. Rev. 355, 402 & n.274 (1982). "Through us" 
items pose analytical problems because the drawer is not a customer of the bank and, 
therefore, the UCC may not apply to some aspects of the transaction. /d. at 402. 
12. Chaired by Professor Herbert Wechsler, the Permanent Editorial Board of the 
UCC is a joint committee of the National COnference of COmmissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCC) and the American Law Institute (ALI). Both the NCC and ALI were 
created in response to the need for unification and betterment of law in the United States. 
The NCC was founded in 1892. The COnference, made up of unpaid commissioners 
appointed by state governors, primarily prepares acts in the commercial field for possible 
adoption by state legislatures. W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 
272 (1973). In its early years, the NCC restricted itself to areas "where Congress had no 
jurisdiction." Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, 30 Law & COntemp. Probs. 233, 237 (1965). 
The ALI, responsible for the first "Restatements," had its beginnings in a 1921 pro-
ject-a "juristic centre for the betterment of the law"-proposed by the Association of 
American Law Schools. The recommendation of the project was that the ALI should be 
initiated and "that its first major undertaking should be to prepare a 'restatement of the 
law.'" W. Twining, supra, at 273-74. See generally Goodrich, The Story of the American 
Law Institute, 1951 Wash. U.L.Q. 283; Lewis, History oftlze American Lall' Institute and 
the First Restatement of the Law, in Restatement in the COurts 1 (perm. ed. 1945). 
13. The 3-4-8 COmmittee was created by the Permanent Editorial Board in 1974 to 
study Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the UCC. The COmmittee is a combination of academicians 
and practicing commercial lawyers, some of whom have represented consumer groups. 
Federal Reserve Board Staff members have attended COmmittee meetings. See Memoran-
dum from Hal Scott to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(June 15, 1983) (introduction to UNPC, P.E.B. Draft No. 3) (available in files of Fordham 
Lall' Review) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Memorandum]. 
14. In 1978, Professor Hal Scott, Reporter to the 3-4-8 Committee, prepared a report 
discussing the conceptual feasibility of a new payments code. See H. Scott, New Payment 
Systems: A Report to the 3-4-8 Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the 
Uniform Commercial COde (Feb. 8, 1978) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) 
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Report]. The report was evaluated in the spring of 1978 at an 
invitational conference in Williamsburg, Virginia attended by bankers, lawyers, academi-
cians, consumer advocates and state and federal regulators. Based on this meeting the 
Permanent Editorial Board authorized the 3-4-8 COmmittee to draft an outline of a 
Uniform New Payments COde. For a history of the three drafts of the UNPC, see 1983 
Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1-3. 
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June 1983, the 3-4-8 Committee released for public consideration P.E.B. 
Draft No. 3 of the UNPC. 15 Passage of the UNPC as either federal or 
state law 16 is not imminent. 17 The seriousness of the Committee's efforts 
and the perseverance of the interested parties, however, justify considera-
tion of the UNPC's scope and provisions at this time. Even though the 
UNPC is not likely to be enacted into law in its present form, 18 it may 
very well have a profound impact on the law of payments devices. 19 
15. On June 26, 1983, P.E.B. Draft No.3 was presented to the NCC. Committees of 
the American Bankers Association, the New York Clearing House Association, and vari-
ous Federal Reserve Banks have reviewed the draft. In addition, three committees of the 
American Bar Association (Uniform Commercial Code Committee, Consumer Financial 
Services Committee, and an Ad Hoc Committee on the Uniform New Payments Code) 
are currently studying the drafts of the proposed code. 
For further discussion of the proposed UNPC, see 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13; 
1978 Report, supra note 14; Benfield, The New Payments Code and the Abolition of 
Holder in Due Course Status as to Consumer Checks, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 11 (1983); 
Geary, One Size Doesn't Fit All-Is a Uniform Payments Code a Good Idea?, 9 Rutgers 
Computer & Tech. L.J. 337 (1983); Pape, Stop Payment in the New Uniform Payments 
Code, 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 353 (1983); Scott I, supra note 6; Scott, The Risk 
Fixers, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Scott II]; Vergari, A Critical 
Look at the New Uniform Payments Code, 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 317 (1983). 
16. In his 1978 Report, Professor Scott gave three reasons why the Code should be 
adopted at the federal level rather than in the states by amendments to Articles 3 and 4: 
the necessity of integrating existing federal law of credit cards; the guarantee of uniform-
ity at the federal level; and the desire to allow some federal regulatory body to flesh out 
the basic statutory provisions. 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 253-54. "Of course, the 
federalizing of payment law, including check law ... may offend those who believe com-
mercial laws should be a state concern, but they must recognize the reality of increasing 
federal intervention in this area." Id. at 254. In the 1983 Memorandum, however, Pro-
fessor Scott recognized that the federal government has "demonstrated an unwillingness 
to preempt state law [on consumer issues] .... It may make sense, therefore, to pursue 
both federal and state enactment of the Code." 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 46-
47. He also recognized the possibility of either coordination of state and federal enact· 
ment or amendment of federal acts to defer to state legislation. I d. 
Similar concerns also attended the enactment of the UCC. The predecessor to Article 
2 of the UCC was the aborted effort to pass a Federal Sales Bill in Congress, which would 
have remedied some of the inconsistencies of the Uniform Sales Act. Karl Llewellyn and 
others supported such federal legislation on the ground that if Congress acted, it would 
be difficult for the states not to follow. The President of the NCC, William Schnadcr, 
however, supported maintenance of a decentralized government and was suspicious of 
congressional intervention. W. Twining, supra note 12, at 277-78; cf. Gilmore I, supra 
note 2, at 1358 (predicting increase of governmental intervention in commercial 
agreements). 
17. Before promulgation and approval, the NCC requires two "readings." National 
Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Constitution § 8.1-.3, reprinted in Hand-
book of the National Conference of Commissioners 254, 260-61 (1979). The ALI must 
also approve the draft. American Law Inst., Bylaws, Part V, reprinted in 58 A.L.I. Proc. 
667, 672 (1982); Scott I, supra note 6, at 1665 n.IO. 
18. There are indications that the 3-4-8 Committee has already begun work on a new 
draft of the UNPC. Letter from Marion W. Benfield, Jr., member, Permanent Editorial 
Board, to Professor Peter A. Alces (Jan. 27, 1984) (available in files of Fordham Law 
Review). 
19. Due to the pervasive nature of the proposed UNPC and the recognized inapplica-
bility of the UCC to the new payments systems, the mere existence of the draft payments 
code will likely have an impact on the evolving law of payments systems. In addition to 
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Professor Hal Scott, Reporter for the UNPC, has asserted that there is 
no real jurisprudence of commerciallaw.2° Such a view ignores the work 
of the UCC drafters, who expended considerable effort formulating a ju-
risprudence of commercial codification and applying it to the provisions 
of the UCC. Their perspective was founded on concepts of legal realism 
and, as a result, they established commercial procedures that make the 
UCC more a restatement of expedient commercial practices than an ef-
fort to modify business custom. 
The portions of the UNPC that are consistent with notions of legal 
realism work well. Payments laws drafted along the lines suggested by 
the established dynamics of the payments process will more likely attain 
the type of symmetry that the UCC achieves. By focusing on particular 
sections of the current draft UNPC, this Article will demonstrate the 
benefits of codifying payments law in a manner consistent with the juris-
prudential perspective of the attorneys and academicians responsible for 
the UCC. It is when the drafters of the UNPC forsake that perspective 
that the draft payments code fails. Confronted by a payments code that 
does not work, the constituencies primarily concerned with payments 
law will withhold their approval of offending provisions and prevent pas-
sage of comprehensive legislation.21 
The thesis of this Article is that only a "true code" that accommodates 
diverse and often divergent interests will improve payments law. To 
achieve that goal a payments code must be comprehensive; that is, it 
must be pervasive in scope, codifying the general law of payments sys-
tems, paper-based as well as electronic. It should follow the example set 
by the UCC and respond to current legislative deficiencies by clarifying 
the law of payments devices rather than by attempting to change the 
habits of the financial community. The new code should be no more 
the several articles that the draft uniform payments code has occasioned, see supra note 
15, courts confronted with the shortcomings of current payments law have cited the draft 
UNPC. Rg., Santos v. First Nat'l State Bank, 186 N.J. Super. 52, 71 n.25, 451 A.2d 401, 
410 n.25 (1982) (UNPC would clarify status of cashier's checks as cash equivalents). 
Similar references were made when the proposed UCC was first drafted. See, e.g., Steller 
v. Thomas, 232 Minn. 275, 278 n.3, 45 N.W.2d 537, 539 n.2 (1950) (sic) (cite to sales 
provision of draft UCC); Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 11 Misc. 2d 312,314, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309, 
311 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (discussing implied warranty provisions of proposed UCC). 
20. Scott II, supra note 15, at 737. In a later article, however, Professor Scott states 
that in some situations the proposed UNPC "abandons contractual principles for allocat-
ing the risk of liability among the drawer and payor and transmitting account institu-
tions, and applies principles drawn from tort law." Scott I, supra note 6, at 1699. 
21. Indeed, there are indications that the financial community's uneasiness with the 
current draft UNPC treatment of consumer issues may require the deletion of those pro-
visions from future drafts of the UNPC. The 3-4-8 Committee asked Professor Scott to 
rework P.E.B. Draft No. 3 and to "leave consumer protection measures to federal enact-
ments." Leary & Fry, A "Systems" Approach to Payment Modes: Mo,·ing Toward a New 
Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283, 286 n.8 (1984). A UNPC devoid of consumer provi-
sions would render impotent any effort at comprehensive codification of payments law. 
A statute that ignored the special equities attending consumer drawers could in no way 
be a pre-emptive enactment, a true code. Professor Scott expressed just such a concern at 
the·1983 Uniform New Payments Code Invitational Conference. 
HeinOnline -- 53 Fordham L. Rev. 90 1984-1985
90 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
ambitious than absolutely necessary, and should represent an evolution-
ary rather than a revolutionary step in the development of payments law. 
Payments legislation should not impose artificial legal distinctions 
among the various payments media. Before providing one transactor lia-
bility rule for checks and a different rule for credit cards, there must be a 
substantial reason for doing so. The desirability of such uniform treat-
ment is the guiding philosophy of the UNPC effort: "[T]he new legal 
framework should not distort user choices among different payment sys-
tems, whether they be paper or card based, or electronic. . . . [T]he 
same legal consequences [should] attach to all kinds of transactions, 
where technology and the nature of the transaction [permit]."22 That 
guiding philosophy may be termed "internal uniformity." This Article 
will suggest the proper balance of internal uniformity and variety of 
transactor choice by reference to code-drafting methodology. Insofar as 
the right to stop or reverse payments lends itself to controversy, focus on 
the stop payment and reversibility sections of the UNPC offers a dy-
namic context in which to appraise the success of the drafters' ambitious 
efforts. 
The first section of this Article suggests the jurisprudential predisposi-
tion of the UCC drafters. The arguments for and against the codification 
of payments law are then evaluated by reference to the goals of commer-
cial codification. Next, the UNPC drafters' identification of "common 
denominators" is presented as a necessary prerequisite to understanding 
the UNPC formulation of the right to stop or reverse payment, as well as 
to appreciating the efficacy of a provision of those rights by reference to 
essential principles of payments law. Finally, a proposal is made to over-
come commentators' reservations with the UNPC provision for reversal 
of payment. 
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW AS A RESPONSE 
Over twenty years ago, in an article concerning the "true code" nature 
of the UCC, William Hawkland explained the significance of codifica-
tion. 23 He suggested that a code, unlike a mere statute, is a "pre-emptive, 
22. 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1. 
23. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. Ill. L.F. 291. 
Hawk1and's article shares many of the views adressed in Beutel, The Necessity of a New 
Technique of Interpreting the N.LL.-The Civil Law Analogy, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1931). 
Professor Beutel suggested that if a proper science of interpreting uniform laws is to be 
developed, a new system must be built that recognizes the statute and not the decisions as 
the basic source of law. /d. at 19 & n.61. See generally State of N.Y. Law Revision 
Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Problems of Codification of Commercial 
Law, Legislative Doc. No. 65(A), at 11 (1955) (considering codification of commercial 
law of N.Y.), reprinted in 1 State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law 
Revision Comm'n for 1955, at 41; Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Probs. 330 (1951) (discussing codification ofcommer-
cial1aw); Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037 (1961) (same). 
At the time he wrote the "Methodology" article, Hawkland was a Professor at the 
University of Illinois College of Law. Currently he is Chancellor and Professor, Louisi-
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systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law,"24 and 
argued the merits of codification in the commercial context. 
The composition and promulgation of the UCC were a jurisprudential 
experiment.25 The UCC drafters focused on the purposes of commercial 
codification and ordered the essential principles26 to realize certain con-
trolling objectives: clarity, simplicity, convenience, fairness, complete-
ness, accessibility and uniformity. 27 A code that reflects an 
accommodation of those seven goals would be pre-emptive, systematic 
ana State University Law Center. Chancellor Hawkland is also an Alternate Member of 
the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC and a member of the National Conference of 
Commissioners-on Uniform State Laws. 
24. Hawkland, supra note 23, at 292. Hawkland placed the proper emphasis on 
"comprehensiveness" by focusing on the "operational-body-of-law" concept, which "dic-
tates that the set [of laws] be sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be 
administered in accordance with its own basic policies." /d. at 310. It is premature to 
pass final judgment on the scope of the current draft UNPC. The draft excepts two-party 
credit cards (for example, department store accounts) from its coverage and may thereby 
run afoul of the "operational body of law" requirement. The UNPC "applies to any 
orders . . . payable by or at, or transmitted by or to, an account institution, and Articles 
3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code do not apply even though the order meets the 
requirements of those Articles." U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 2(1). The "Purpose" state-
ment following the provision explains that two-party merchant credit cards are "not cov-
ered unless used to access an account for payment to a party other than the issuer. . . . 
The drawer does not initiate a direction to pay but requests the delivery of merchandise 
against a line of credit or a cash balance held with the merchant." /d. § 2 comment 1 on 
purpose. "An order is a complete and unconditional direction by a person to pay . . . 
from an account which may be accessed to pay a person other than the drawer or the 
drawee .... " /d. § 10(1)(b). 
Hawkland's impatience with "supplemental" and "fragmentary" enactments has evi-
dently not been appreciated by the American Bankers Association Uniform Payments 
Code Committee. See Letter from W. Robert Moore, Chairman of the American Bank-
ers Association, to Robert Haydock, Chairman of the 3-4-8 Committee (July 15, 1983) 
(discussing deficiencies in Permanent Editorial Board Draft No. 3) (available in files of 
Fordham Law Review). 
25. Professor Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
wrote extensively in the area of jurisprudence. See, e.g., K.. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 
(1951); K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960); K. Llew-
ellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (1962). Several of the attorneys 
who were brought together to work on the UCC have claimed that they lacked any par-
ticular expertise in commercial law prior to their association for the UCC project. See, 
e.g., Coogan, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 545, 545 (1982) ("Soia [Ment-
schikoft] says that she got into the Code by accident."); Leary, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 
Ohio St. L.J. 557, 557 (1982) (described as one who was accepted for the Code's drafting 
staff "because I knew absolutely nothing about it."); Mentschikoff, Reflections of a 
Drafter, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 537, 542 (1982) ("There wasn't a single expert on the editorial 
board."). 
26. For discussions on the role of "essential principles" in commercial law, see Gil-
more I, supra note 2, at 1348 (thrust of law was to conform increasingly intricate transac-
tions to simple basic formula); Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply ro 
Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.J. 364, 365 (1952) (UCC should "state basic principles under 
which business transactions can be carried out") [hereinafter cited as Gilmore II]; Llew-
ellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 687, 696 (1948) 
(should seek to develop "relatively simple set of basic legal patterns which can meet the 
essential needs of. . . a welter of variant practice") [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn I]. 
27. See Llewellyn I, supra note 26, at 687-90. 
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and comprehensive. It is inappropriate to conclude, however, that the 
success of the UCC experiment mandates code treatment of each and 
every piece of legislation affecting commerce. Indeed, the efficacy of cod-
ification in a particular commercial context must be demonstrated in 
light of current circumstances. Whether a true payments code is desira-
ble necessarily depends on whether the problems to which the UCC 
drafters were responding are present now with regard to payments 
systems. 
The UCC drafters encountered a body of commercial law comprised of 
multifarious "uniform" acts, which had not achieved pervasive accept-
ance, 28 and vague "law merchant" principles. 29 These laws lacked the 
precision and predictability that the drafters deemed vital to the interests 
of those engaged in commerce. 3° Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafts-
man of the UCC, recognized that the several uniform acts had been com-
posed one-by-one, presented for adoption at different times in different 
jurisdictions, and, consequently, contained "clashes of theory and uncov-
ered gaps."31 The commercial law was "haphazard" and lacked coher-
ence, as different frames of reference had produced legislation that ran in 
"perplexingly different directions.'m Piecemeal amendment of existing 
laws would only have exacerbated the problem. Such patchwork read-
justment, guided only by "legal patterns of happenstance origin,"33 could 
not have improved but would merely have changed the existing law.34 
What was needed was a comprehensive focus responsive to the real defi-
ciencies in commercial law and sufficiently flexible to accommodate both 
technological innovation and the increasing sophistication of commercial 
28. The NCC promulgated other uniform acts, which achieved some success. See 
Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 
798, 799 (1958). The task of adopting any of the uniform acts proved arduous. It took 47 
years for every state to adopt the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. W. Twining, supra note 
12, at 272-73. After fifty years, only 35 states had adopted the Uniform Sales Act. /d. 
"(It has] never taken less than ten years between the date of promulgation of an act and 
its adoption by a majority of the states." /d. at 273. 
29. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 61 (1921) (law merchant is 
not fixed or stereotyped). See generally Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales,· 
Should it be Enacted?, 59 Yale L.J. 821, 822-24 (1950) (discussion of law merchant prin-
ciples). The "law merchant" was the system of rules, customs and usages that developed 
in England to regulate dealings among merchants and traders. The use of documents 
such as negotiable notes and bills became so prevalent that law merchant rules became 
applicable to most commercial transactions. /d. at 823-24. 
30. See Hawkland, supra note 23, at 299 ("[U]ncomprehensive and unsystematic 
commercial statutes, even if widely enacted, inevitably result in lack of uniformity and 
certainty."); see also F. Beutel, Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law 89 nn.38-40 (7th 
ed. 1948) (citing over 75 instances where, on identical problems, courts interpreted sec-
tions of the Negotiable Instruments Law inconsistently); Corbin, supra note 29, at 834-35 
(old law of sales needed improved rules, analysis, organization and remedies); Gilmore II, 
supra note 26, at 367 (many conflicts arose in judicial construction of earlier acts). 
31. Llewellyn I, supra note 26, at 690. 
32. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Comercial Code, 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 367, 
371 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn II]; see Gilmore I, supra note 2, at 1342. 
33. Llewellyn I, supra note 26, at 688. 
34. See id. 
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practices. 35 
Experience prior to the UCC and a sense of the needs of the business 
community enabled the drafters to "distinguish passing fad from the 
more permanent trend,"36 and to identify certain fundamental principles 
crucial to the success of pre-emptive codification. They focused on ex-
isting commercial practices and prepared the several articles to give e!fect 
to the intentions, expectations and objectives of the transactors. Changes 
in the law were not made for the sake of making changes. Because they 
were properly mindful of the appropriate (conservative) contours of the 
endeavor, the drafters composed a code that has since been recognized as 
benchmark commercial codification. This Article assumes the success of 
the UCC experiment and considers the desirability of a payments code 
drafted from the same jurisprudential perspective. 
A caveat is in order. While this Article will argue the merits of pay-
ments law codification (perhaps the more accurate term is re-codifica-
tion),37 the case will not be made for the promulgation of P.E.B. Draft 
No. 3 of the UNPC. It is premature to jump to any such conclusion. 
Rather, the instant inquiry treats those considerations which are, or, it is 
urged, should be prerequisite to true codification of this area of commer-
ciallaw. 
II. SHOULD CURRENT PAYMENTS LAW BE CODIFIED'? 
The present law of payments devices is convoluted, but that state of 
affairs is not universally lamented. Change is resisted both by those who 
represent financial institutions and by those who would safeguard the 
interests of consumers. The arguments for and against true codification 
of payments law are now sufficiently developed to accommodate inquiry 
into their comparative merits in light of the goals of "code" 
methodology. 
A. Existing Law 
The current law of payments systems is at times contradictory,38 occa-
sionally merely inconsistent,39 and too often virtually nonexistent.40 The 
35. See id. 
36. Llewellyn II, supra note 32, at 372. Llewellyn reasoned that statutes should be 
written in terms of the modern and foreseeable needs of the commerctal world. /d. 
37. Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC were, at the time they were enacted, supposed to be 
the "uniform payments code." 
38. "Visa checks" are one type of modern payment device as to which current Jaw is 
uncertain and contradictory. They are furnished to a cardholder by the issuer/financial 
institution. The cardholder can write checks against his line of credit. Substantial ques-
tion~ have been raised as to the law applicable to this new payment device. See Memo-
randum from Donald J. Rapson to the 1983 Uniform New Payments Code ln\•itational 
Conference (Sept. 30, 1983) (should "MasterChecking" be treated as a method of pay-
ment or an extension of credit, a check loan or a credit card cash ad\·ance?) (available in 
files of Fordham Law Review). 
39. A classic example of such inconsistency is "double forgery" under Article 4, 
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law is nevertheless familiar to commercial attorneys: There is a body of 
financial institution protection legislation;41 a separate body of consumer 
protection legislation;42 and, finally, a payments system governed only by 
common law contract and tort principles.43 A comparison of the two 
legislative perspectives (pro-bank and pro-consumer) with regard to stop 
payments manifests the incoherence of current payments law. 
Uniform state law-Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC-governs check 
transactions.44 Article 4, "Bank Deposits and Collections," was drafted 
with the interests of bank counsel in mind. The drafters' initial attempts 
to place heavy responsibilities on the banks and to limit contractual ex-
oneration from liability were vigorously opposed by bank counsel. At 
times it appeared that the conflict could only be settled by dropping Ar-
ticle 4 from the Code, but a draft acceptable to the banks ultimately was 
where a check has both a forged drawer's signature and a forged endorsement. The pri· 
mary issue is whether the doctrine of final payment under UCC § 3-418 controls, mean-
ing that the drawee bank absorbs the loss, or if the forged endorsement, despite final 
payment, allows the drawee to place the loss upstream on a breach of warranty of title 
theory. See B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 6.5, at 6-103 to -104; Note, Commercial Paper: 
Double Forgeries and Loss Allocation Under the U.C.C.: The Fork in the Yellow Brick 
Road, 7 Stetson Intra. L. Rev. 241, 246-52 (1978). Compare Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage 
Bank, 92 Wis. 2d 784, 285 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1979), a.ff'd, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 299 
N.W.2d 829 (1981) (precluding commercial depositor from asserting any claim against 
non-negligent bank from forgery losses) with Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. Girard Bank, 522 
F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (refusing to give effect to exculpatory clause that shifted 
forgery losses to corporate drawer; embezzler used signature facsimile machine). The 
leading case on double forgery is Perini Corp. v. First Nat'] Bank, 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 
1977). The court treated the double forgery as a forged drawer's signature, thus placing 
the loss on the drawee. /d. at 414-16. Professor Clark has called Perini "one of the most 
significant Article 4 decisions to date." B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 6.5, at 6-108. For a 
detailed analysis of Perini, see Baker, The Perini Case: Double Forgery Revisited (pts. 1 & 
2), 10 U.C.C. L.J. 309 (1978), 11 U.C.C. L.J. 41 (1978). For a discussion and analysis of 
both Perini and Cumis, see B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 2.1, at S2-2 to -3 (Cum. Supp. 1983). 
40. See Scott I, supra note 6, at 1664 (fragmentary body of common law governing 
wtre transfers); see also NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 7-8 (several problem areas 
left unresolved by UNPC). 
41. Article 4 of the UCC is classified by many commentators as financial institution 
protection legislation. See, e.g., Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code 
Should Not Be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334, 361-62 (1952); Gilmore II, supra note 26, at 
374-75; Leary & Schmitt, supra note 10, at 613-14. 
42. The stated purpose of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r 
(I 982), is to provide "a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsi· 
bilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems . . . [and providing for] indi-
vidual consumer rights." /d.§ 1693(b). See H.R. Rep. No. 1315, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 
(1978). For more on the EFT A, see Brandel & Olliff, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act: 
A Primer, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 531 (1979); Fox, Another Step Toward the Cashless Society? 
The 1978 Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 18 Am. Bus. L.J. 209 (1980); Schellie, 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 34 Bus. Law. 1441 (1979); Taffer, The Making oftlze Elec· 
tronic Fund Transfer Act: A Look at Consumer Liability and Error Resolution, 13 
U.S.F.L. Rev. 231 (1979). 
43. Scott I, supra note 6, at 1676-78. 
44. See supra note 7 for authorities that have considered the continued vitality of 
Articles 3 and 4. 
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included.45 
There are several examples of the Code's pro-financial institution bias 
in Article 4, only some of which have been emasculated by consumer 
protectionist courts.46 The "balance" struck by Article 4 is perhaps best 
illustrated by section 4-403, "Customer's Right to Stop Payment; Bur-
den of Proof of Loss, "47 which has been referred to as a "wonder of bank 
lobbying."48 In the event a bank pays an item in violation of a cus-
tomer's stop payment order, the section places the "burden of establish-
ing the fact and amount of loss resulting from the payment" on the 
customer.49 Moreover, section 4-40750 provides financial institutions 
with "another strong counterweight to the right of the customer to stop 
payment under section 4-403":51 The bank may be subrogated to the 
rights of a holder in due course, or to the rights of the payee or the 
drawer, in Order "to prevent unjust enrichment. "52 
Predictably, there is no provision for reversal of payment of an 
45. Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
1962 U. Ill. L.F. 321, 326-27. 
46. Section 3-419(3), for example, was intended to restrict the conversion liability of 
depositary and collecting banks. See U.C.C. § 3-419(3) & official comment 5 (1977). 
But, as Professors White and Summers have commented, "the couns have taken up sec-
tion 3-419(3), and what they have done to it shouldn't happen to a dog." J. White & R. 
Summers, supra note 10, at 591-92. Some courts have remained faithful to the drafters' 
intent. See, e.g., Keane v. Pan Am. Bank, 309 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
(bank not liable for processing check after dissolution of partnership). One coun simply 
ignored the section. See McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874, 883-86 (fenn. 
1973). Usually couns avoid the intent of the subsection by finding that the depositary 
bank did not act in accordance with "reasonable commercial standards." See Hanover 
Ins. Cos. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 508 (D. Kan. 1979); see also 
Note, Depository Bank Liability Under§ 3-419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 676 (1974) (discussing various ways couns have approached § 3-
419(3)). 
47. u.c.c. § 4-403 (1977). 
48. B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 2.6[2], at 2-48. Any "duty" owed by the bank is effec-
tively eliminated by subsection three. One commentator, however, has somewhat cre-
atively reasoned that this section is consumer-oriented. See Pape, supra note IS, at 353 
n.3. But see Beutel, supra note 39, at 361-62 (commentator asserting the pro-financial 
institution bias of Article 4); Gilmore II, supra note 26, at 374 (same); Leary & Schmitt, 
supra note 10, at 620 (noting Article 4's support of banking practices). 
49. u.c.c. § 4-403(3) (1977). 
50. Id. § 4-407. 
51. B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 2.6[2],at 2-50. 
52. U.C.C. § 4-407 (1977). There is disagreement regarding the meaning of "unjust 
enrichment." Compare J. White & R. Summers, supra note 10, at 690 n.l34 ("[T]he 
phrase at best states the purpose of the section, and at worst it adds meaningless confu-
sion.") with Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
49 Marq. L. Rev. 331, 367 (1965) ("[T]he obvious justification [for§ 4-407) is the preven-
tion of unjust enrichment at the expense of the payor bank who may be deemed to have 
paid out its own tunds."). See generally 1. Calamari and J. Perillo, Contracts 571 {2d ed. 
1977) (general discussion of unjust enrichment); Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937) 
(same); Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208 (1973) 
(same). 
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"item"53 in Article 4. The banking community's interest in finality of 
payment would likely never have permitted such a provision at the time 
the UCC was drafted. The existence of a similar right in contemporary 
credit card law indicates a pro-consumer shift in the mood and predispo-
sition of legislators. While the consumer's power pursuant to Regulation 
Z54 and the Fair Credit Billing Act55 is not absolute, this federal legisla-
tion is more solicitous of the buyer's right to utilize payment leverage56 
against vendors than is Article 4. A customer who authorizes a charge to 
his credit card account (for example, signs the Visa slip) may resist pay-
ment to the merchant if the sale is for fifty dollars or more and the con-
sumer's billing address is in the same state as, or within a 100 mile radius 
of, the merchant-seller's place of business. 57 The credit card law thereby 
modifies the result under Article 4 and notably eliminates the subroga-
tion theory of UCC section 4-407. 
Other consumer protection legislation in the current "patchwork" of 
payments law-namely the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFT A)58 and 
the Federal Reserve Board Regulations59 promulgated pursuant 
thereto--provides for a consumer's right to stop payment but does not 
provide a right to reverse. 60 Although the scope of the EFT A appears 
pervasive, several initial exclusions from its coverage severely curtail the 
Act's impact on the law of payments devices. 61 The exclusion of wire 
53. An "item" is defined in Article 4 as negotiable and non-negotiable paper calling 
for the payment of money. U.C.C. § 4-104(g) & official comment 4 (1977). 
54. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.29 (1984). Cardholder liability for a lost or stolen credit card 
is limited to the lesser of $50 or the amount charged prior to the issuer being notified. !d. 
§ 226. 12(b)(l). Regulation Z also delineates the procedures for dealing with credit card 
billing disputes, id. § 226.13(c)-(d), and describes the information that must be given to 
customers in their periodic statements, id. § 226.7. See generally Weistart, Consumer 
Protection in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative Controls, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 
1475 (1972) (discussing statutes and regulations governing credit cards); Note, Credit 
Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 Yale L.J. 1418 (1968) (discussing federal legislation 
dealing with credit card fraud). 
55. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301-306, 88 Stat. 1500, 1511-12 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982)). The Act establishes procedures for the 
creditor and customer to follow with regard to billing errors. N. Penney & D. Baker, 
supra note 1, ~ 10.02[2][d], at 10-32 to -34. 
56. See Nimmer, Consumer Payment Systems: Leverage Effects Within An Electronic 
Funds Transfer System, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 487, 507-09 (1980). 
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1982). For a thorough discussion of that reversibility pro-
vision and its similarity to the Federal Trade Commission Rule on Preservation of Con-
sumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1984), see B. Clark, supra note 2, ~ 
9.7[2]-[3], at 9-34 to -41. 
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982) (originally enacted as Title XX of the Financial 
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 
§ 2001, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728-41). The EFTA governs transactions such as "point-of-sale 
transfers, automated teller machine transfers, direct deposits or withdrawals of funds, 
and transfers initiated by telephone." 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(g) (1984). 
59. 12 C.F.R. § 205.1-.14 (1984). 
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693e (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(c) (1984). States are permitted 
to increase but not to restrict the EFT A's provision of consumer rights. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1693q (1982). 
61. The EFTA excepts "check guarantee or authorization services," "wire transfers," 
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transfer systems62 is perhaps most noteworthy. This lack of comprehen-
sive legislation in the stop payment area thus evidences the inconsisten-
cies and incoherence of current payments law. 
B. "Risk Fixing" and Other Arguments for a Comprehensil'e 
Payments Code 
Professor Scott recognized the necessity-indeed, inevitability-of a 
payments code in a 1978 article63 in which he stated: "The commercial 
law of bank collection . . . reflects the desire of transactors to alter the 
competitive effects of the existing allocation of risk. Commercial legisla-
tion becomes the method by which particular interests achieve their sub-
stantive objectives, instead of a means by which society develops a 
rational payments system."64 Once the affected transactors perceive a 
risk allocation system to be unfavorable to them, they will endeavor to fix 
the risks to which they are exposed in order to establish the most desira-
ble "competitive" environment. Professor Scott argued that the Ameri-
can Bankers Association Bank Collection Code (Bank Code)65 was a 
"certain securities or commodities transfers," "certain automatic [credit-debit] trans-
fers," "certain telephone-initiated transfers," "trust accounts" and "pre-authorized trans-
fers to small financial institutions." 12 C.F.R. § 205.3 (1984). 
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (1984). The application of 
EFfA consumer protection mechanisms to such commercial (wholesale) payments sys-
tems would be enormously wasteful. It would also duplicate existing private contracts 
and association rules. The mechanics of the individual wire transfer systems (Fed Wire, 
Bank Wire II, CHIPS and S.W.I.F.T., see supra note 6) are governed by separate "oper.lt-
ing rules." See Scott I, supra note 6, at 1669-74. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 210.25-.38 
(1984) (rules governing Fed\Vire); Rules Governing the Computerized Clearing House 
Interbank Payment Systems (1974) (CHIPS Rules) (available in files of Fordham lAw 
Review); N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1, ~~ 16.01-.04, at 16-1 to -13 (discussing wire 
transfer rules). Moreover, federal regulations already govern wire transfers accomplished 
by Fed\Vire, the communications and settlement system operated by the Federal Reserve 
Banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 210.25-.38 (1984). The Federal Reserve System requires rapid 
movement of messages between the various banks and branch offices. Currently, each 
Federal Reserve district office has communications switches to which Reserve Banks, 
branches, offices, the Treasury and member banks are interconnected by way of a com-
puter message switching complex in Culpepper, Virginia. This allows administrative and 
research information to be sent quickly and accurately. See N. Penney & D. Baker, supra 
note 1, ~ 9.02, at 9-3. Fed\Vire effects bilateral net settlement at the end of each banking 
day. Scott I, supra note 6, at 1670. S.W.I.F.T. has no settlement capacity. N. Penney & 
D. Baker, supra note 1, ~ 9.05, at 9-14. For a thorough treatment of the application of 
the UNPC to wire transfers, see Scott I, supra note 6. 
63. Scott II, supra note 15. 
64. Id. at 792. 
65. Drafted by Thomas Paton, counsel for the American Bankers Association, and 
completed in 1929, the Bank Code was a direct predecessor of Article 4 of the UCC. See 
U.C.C. § 4-101 official comment (1977) ("This article adopts many of the rules of the 
[Bank] Code . . . ."). Comments to several sections of Article 4 mention the Bank 
Code. Scott II, supra note IS, at 761 n.80; e.g., official comments to U.C.C. §§ 4-201 to-
204,4-207 to -208, 4-211 to -214, 4-301 to -302 (1977). See generally Beutel, The Proposed 
Uniform Bank Collections Act and Possibility of Recodification of the lAw on Negotiable 
Instruments, 9 Tul. L. Rev. 378 (1935) (discussing ABA Code); Bogert, Failed Banks. 
Collection Items, and Trust Preferences, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 545 (1931) (same); Paton, 
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response to the "risk distortion" imposed on the check collection system 
by the courts and the Federal Reserve System during the early part of 
this century.66 The Bank Code was "principally a mechanism for elimi-
nating the risk differential between participant and nonparticipant banks 
by allocating all significant collection risks to depositors ... [and] 
clearly served the interests of banks. "67 It had been adopted in eighteen 
states by 1932.68 Many of its provisions were restatements of bank-cus-
tomer contract terms69 that several courts had determined to be uncon-
stitutional sometime before the Bank Code's promulgation.70 Moreover, 
the Bank Code experiment was a not-so-covert attempt to undermine ap-
plication of the Sherman Act:71 "Since they could not fix prices, banks 
turned to risk fixing."72 Because financial institutions promulgated the 
Bank Code in an effort to avoid "risk differentials" among participant 
Bank Collection Legislation, 46 Banking L.J. 508 (1929) (same); Steffen, The Check Col· 
lection Muddle, 10 Tul. L. Rev. 537 (1936) (same); Townsend, The Bank Collection Code 
of the American Bankers' Association, 8 Tul. L. Rev. 21 (1933) (same). 
66. In the late 1800's and early 1900's, financial institutions attempted to impose the 
risks of the check collection process on their customers by contract. Courts responded by 
construing the contracts against the banks. See, e.g., Harter v. Bank of Brunson, 92 S.C. 
440, 444, 75 S.E. 696, 697 (1912). At the same time, private clearinghouse associations, 
mostly in Boston and New York, were fixing prices on collection charges. Member banks 
were required to charge their customers a fixed rate for collection of out-of-town-items. 
Scott II, supra note 15, at 747. Because of these abuses and inefficiencies the Federal 
Reserve Board, created in 1913, became part of the check collection process. Jd. at 747-
48; see Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 16, 38 Stat. 251, 268 {1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 248(o) (1982)). This federal intrusion affected bank charges as well as the four major 
collection risks: "(1) nonpayment in direct forwarding, (2) negligent collecting practices 
of intermediate banks, (3) acceptance of worthless remittance in payment, and (4) non-
payment attributable to circuitous routing." Scott II, supra note 15, at 756. The financial 
institutions then attempted to avoid the risk-shifting of the Federal Reserve by fixing the 
prices that they charged for assuming certain risks, but this exposed the banks to sanc-
tions for violating the antitrust laws. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 
58 (1911) (holding price fixing illegal). 
67. Scott II, supra note 15, at 762. 
68. See F. Beutel, supra note 30, at 133; Steffen, supra note 65, at 540 n.20. 
69. Scott II, supra note 15, at 762 ("[Bank] Code incorporated the provisions of the 
[American Bankers Association] standard form contract."). 
70. See Beutel, supra note 41, at 358; Scott II, supra note 15, at 761. The court in 
Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd, 142 N.C. 187, 55 S.E. 95 (1906), after overriding a clear 
contractual provision, commented: 
While the convenience of persons and corporations engaged in particular lines 
of business, and the general custom recognized and acted upon, are properly 
given consideration in the construction of contracts and fixing rules of duty and 
liability, elementary principles of law founded upon the wisdom and experience 
of the ages should not be violated. 
Id. at 198, 55 S.E. at 99. 
71. It was estimated that in 1913, 91 of the 242 clearinghouse associations in the 
country fixed collection charges. See Money Trust Investigation: Before the Subcomm. of 
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency Reform, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 216,218 (1913). 
"[T]he potential application of the Sherman Act probably made overt attempts to reach 
such [agreements] unfeasible." Scott II, supra note 15, at 760. By 1924, these collection 
charges had disappeared principally because of their increased vulnerability to antitrust 
attack. Id. 
72. Scott II, supra note 15, at 760. 
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and nonparticipant banks, Professor Scott concluded that the risk differ-
ential among new payments systems would occasion a similar reaction 
from financial institutions today.73 We might, therefore, assume that fi-
nancial institutions would be at the forefront of the UNPC movement, 
but this is not the case. 74 
The financial community may not be convinced of the need for a pay-
ments code that attempts to adjust risks in the same way the Bank Code 
did. Professor Scott reported that because of antitrust law developments, 
banks determined that they could not fix the prices of customer serv-
ices.75 The Bank Code was a statutory attempt to do to consumers what 
the American Bankers Association had been unable to do through the 
use ofform contracts.76 The Bank Code's anti-competitive effects did not 
go unnoticed.77 Confronted with the risk differential produced today by 
new payments systems, financial institutions could very well hesitate to 
endorse legislation that almost certainly would conflict with antitrust 
principles and would invite judicial as well as legislative scorn in the con-
temporary pro-consumer environment. 
Furthermore, financial institutions have good reason to feel comforta-
ble with the current risk differentiation. The allocation of risk provided 
by Article 4 (with regard to checks) and the common law of contract 
(with regard to wire transfers) better serves banks than would a regime 
that would extend some of the consumer protection provisions of debit 
and credit card law to check and wire transactions.78 If financial institu-
tions were content with the allocation of risks among transactors, a stat-
ute that had as its premise the elimination of that allocation would not 
necessarily gain the support of the financial community. To the extent 
that the risk-fixing hypothesis is invalid or disfavored by financial institu-
tions, the foundation of the UNPC's unitary treatment of different pay-
ment systems is compromised. 
In his 1978 Report to the 3-4-8 Committee, Scott described five needs, 
in addition to risk-fixing, which could be served by the codification of 
payments law: consumer protection controls on contract;79 solution of 
third party problems;80 control of natural monopolies;81 economies of 
73. Id. at 792; 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 43. 
74. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text. 
75. Scott II, supra note 15, at 760. 
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying texL 
77. See supra note 65 for authority criticizing the Bank Code. Professor Beutel de-
scribed it as a vicious type of class legislation in that it attempted to throw all the risk of 
the collection process on the depositors and at the same time preserve for intennediate 
banks all the rights of the holders in due course of the paper that they are collecting. 
Beutel, supra note 41, at 357-58. 
78. It has been estimated that each year $136 trillion is transferred by checks and 
wire transfers, while credit cards account for only $49 billion annually. See Little Re-
port, supra note 6, at 12, table 1. Banks are well protected in the check context by UCC 
Article 4 and by their ability to contract out of risks in wire transfers. 
79. 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 31-35. 
80. Id. at 40. 
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scale in risk allocation;82 and supplementation of contract. 83 Even if the 
risk-fixing hypothesis cannot support the UNPC predisposition toward 
internal uniformity, Scott's five additional arguments suggest that codifi-
cation of payments law is commercially expedient. Indeed, in some in-
stances, compromising the internal uniformity of the draft UNPC may 
not impair but rather may better serve the goals of commercial codifica-
tion perceived by the drafters of the UCC. 84 
Controls on contract-the first of Scott's five additional reasons for 
codification-are necessary because many private contracts prepared by 
financial institutions for execution by consumers have been and will 
likely continue to be largely unacceptable to courts and legislatures. This 
conclusion is supported by experience prior to the promulgation of the 
Bank Code and is clearly indicated by the contemporary "consumer pro-
tectionist" mood of recent payments legislation.85 Another shortcoming 
of private contract would be its inability to bind absent third parties. A 
contract between customer and bank would not affect the rights of at-
taching creditors or possible preferences among claimants to funds held 
by a failed financial institution. Codification could overcome this short-
coming as well. 
Additionally, in the absence of statutory guidance, natural monopolies 
could emerge to structure risk allocations "undisciplined by competitive 
forces."86 Scott argued that although there is no evidence of price-fixing 
in new payments systems, risk-fixing might exist.87 Electronic fund 
transfer and credit card payment systems may already be dominated by 
only one or two major transactors. 88 Scott warned that we will have to 
determine whether those interests may be trusted with private rule-mak-
ing authority without the interposition of comprehensive payments 
81. ld. at 35-38. 
82. Id. at 40-45. 
83. ld. at 45-47. 
84. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
85. The limits of private contract between banks and their customers are presently 
established with regard to checks by UCC § 4-103(1), which prohibits a bank from con-
tractually disclaiming its duties of good faith and ordinary care. The parties may, how-
ever, agree on standards to be used to measure such duties, so long as those standards arc 
not "manifestly unreasonable." U.C.C. § 4-103(1) (1977). Professor Gilmore has ex-
pressed reservations: "The feature of Article 4 as it appears in the final version of the 
Code which is enough to make the entire Article objectionable is the freedom of contract 
section, § 4-103." Gilmore II, supra note 26, at 375. 
The EFr A is more solicitous of the rights of consumers. It forbids "a waiver of any 
right conferred or cause of action created by this subchapter ... [except] a waiver given 
in settlement of a dispute or action." 15 U.S.C. § 1693/ (1982). 
86. 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 35. 
87. ld. 
88. VISA and MasterCard are the two major national credit card systems used by 
consumers. Wire transfers are concentrated in BankWire II and FedWire. Additionally, 
there is only one Automated Clearing House (ACH) per region, and one national system 
for interchange-the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA). !d. at 
36. 
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legislation. 89 
Further, a pervasive statute could establish certain economies of scale 
in risk allocation. If all customers of financial institutions were subject to 
or protected from the same risks, the industry could structure its 
processes and services either to absorb or to guard against losses occa-
sioned by the risk. For example, it would be more efficient if either all 
customers or no customers assumed liability for a forged drawer's signa-
ture. This economies of scale rationale favoring the codification of pay-
ments law is quite similar to an argument originally made to support the 
UCC: "Men of commerce want the best laws, but they can live with 
'right' laws. And they prefer the right law whose meaning is predictable 
and whose application is even, to the best law which operates without 
either uniformity or certainty."90 Similarly, Scott's final argument in 
favor of the codification of payments law "has been a traditional justifica-
tion for the commercial law qua law merchant":91 Uniform commercial 
legislation provides a backstop to contract by establishing a legal regime 
for parties that could be in privity of contract but have failed to make 
provision by private agreement.92 Examples of this are found in the sev-
eral UCC provisions that begin with the phrase "unless otherwise 
agreed. "93 
Each of Scott's additional five "needs" supports the case for codifica-
tion of payments law. Only the "risk fixing" argument, however, goes 
beyond arguing for codification and attempts to establish the desirability 
of imposing the same legal rules on different payments systems. The fi-
nancial community may become more disposed toward the adoption of a 
payments code if a code can be prepared that is consistent with Scott's 
five additional considerations and thereby serves those interests tradition-
ally served by the codification of payments law. 
C. The Case Against a Comprehensive Payments Code 
Representatives of financial institutions have expressed serious reserva-
tions with both the concept and substance of the UNPC. An accessible 
and complete expression of that community's position is the Statement of 
the New York Clearing House on the Proposed Uniform New Payments 
Code.94 The New York Clearing House (NYCH) analogized the various 
payments systems to the several available transportation systems. Just as 
each mode of transport is essentially different in one or more crucial 
ways, so too are payments devices. The NYCH explained: 
89. Id. at 37. 
90. Hawkland, supra note 23, at 320. 
91. 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 45. 
92. See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 45-46. 
93. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-307, 2-308, 2-310, 2-319, 2-322, 2-326, 2-511, 2-513, 2-514, 
3-802, 9-112, 9-503 (1977). 
94. NYCH Statement, supra note 10. "We see no advantage to be derived from cast-
ing aside Articles 3 and 4 simply to develop a 'uniform' or 'comprehensive' payments 
code covering all payment systems." /d. at 2. 
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While the types of legal issues that must be addressed in fashioning a 
law to govern each mode of transportation are similar (i.e., who has 
the right of way; what speed limits, if any, should apply; liability for 
passengers and parcels), would anyone argue that there is an advantage 
in calling pilots, captains, engineers and drivers by one functional 
name . . . or by having one comprehensive code covering all methods 
of transportation?95 
Because of the basic differences between payments systems, the NYCH 
would not subject the various methods of value transfer to unitary treat-
ment. Instead, the organization would "address separately the problems 
identified by the 3-4-8 Committee with electronic funds transfers, Arti-
cles 3 and 4 and, if necessary, other payment systems."96 Such an ap-
proach would necessarily preclude codification of payments law in a 
manner resembling UCC-type "true" codification. 
The analogy on which the NYCH argument is founded is, to say the 
least, far-fetched.97 Although it would be ludicrous to impose the same 
speed limits on airplanes and buses, it is correct to impose on airlines and 
bus companies, as common carriers, the same standard of care toward 
passengers.98 Many such elements of transportation systems, which op-
erate as do our laws of tort and contract (rather than physics), are sus-
ceptible to codification, but that is not to say that the same tort or 
contract rules should apply to distinguishable problems. If overbooking 
is a contract problem in air travel but not in intra-city bus travel, it may 
not be appropriate to subject both systems to the same overbooking regu-
lation. As the NYCH observed, "differences in operational aspects, fre-
quently reflected in the rights and obligations of the parties, constitute 
the reason for the utility of one system over another."99 The inquiry 
should focus on how best to order the differences in the interest of pre-
dictability and certainty. A payments code could formulate the differ-
ences to "identify results that can be justified on efficiency or 
distributional grounds," 100 without impairing or eliminating transactor 
choice. Such a comprehensive enactment could solve essentially different 
problems in different ways but still treat in a single, unitary enactment as 
many problems of payments law as coherently as possible. 
There is a further problem: Reluctant attorneys fear the unknown. 
Although current payments laws overlap and conflict, 101 they are famil-
95. ld. at 10-11. As one commentator has noted, the arguments presented by the 
financial community closely parallel those made in the 1950's when the New York Study 
Commission considered and criticized the proposed UCC. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 
377 n.119. 
96. NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
97. But see Id. at 12 (Notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, "[w]e believe 
that this analogy is not far-fetched."). 
98. SeeR. Hutchinson, A Treatise on the Law of Carriers§§ 893-895 (3d ed. 1906); 
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 34 (4th ed. 1971). 
99. NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 12. 
100. Scott II, supra note 15, at 792. 
101. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
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iar to the lawyers, bankers and the public who work with them regularly. 
As one commentator queried, "having mastered these legal languages, 
should we all now be forced to forget them and learn Esperanto?" 102 
Arguably we should. Commercial attorneys have been willing to 
relearn. 103 But they would be ill-advised to forget the "legal languages" 
they have learned because knowledge of the old rules would aid in con-
struction of a payments code. Moreover, any piecemeal solution to the 
problems of the currently incoherent payments law will require attorneys 
to learn the new "patchwork" but will not guarantee consistent treat-
ment of similarly situated transactors. 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON DENOMINATORS 
Effective codification depends on the identification of common denom-
inators in seemingly different systems and the development of analytical 
and definitional tools that emphasize those essential principles while de-
nying legal effect to insubstantial differences. The architects of the UCC 
set out to formulate, or perhaps more accurately, discover the essential 
principles of commercial law. Once those essential principles were iden-
tified, they served as the foundation on which the UCC experiment has 
developed. The drafters remained sensitive to the problems that transac-
tors familiar with the established law would encounter with legislation 
that purported to make drastic changes. The drafters' choice of essential 
principles was therefore informed by established practices. The same ap-
proach is useful in codifying payments law. 
It is no longer appropriate, if it ever was, to distinguish between pay-
ments systems as either electronic or paper-based. The intrusion of com-
puters into payments procedures has eliminated any bold line that might 
have separated paper-based devices (checks and notes) from those de-
vices that operate in concert with magnetic tapes or telephonic tones. 
The corporeal safety paper "item" of Article 4 stands a very good chance 
of being transformed into an electronic impulse somewhere along its 
journey from drawer to drawee and perhaps back to drawer. 104 The 
credit card slip signed by a customer at point-of-sale is even more likely 
to undergo such a metamorphosis. 105 "The central characteristic of elec-
tronic fund transfers . . . is the use of computer and electronic technol-
ogy in place of checks or other paper items to effectuate the transfer of 
funds." 106 
The UNPC drafters realized that the scope of a uniform payments law 
102. Geary, supra note 15, at 341. Professor Gilmore confronted this same argument 
during the UCC debate. See Gilmore II, supra note 26, at 379 (replying to Professor 
Beutel's assertions in Beutel, supra note 41, at 348). 
103. See Llewellyn, supra note 32, at 368. 
104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
105. See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 19-20. 
106. 2A F. Hart & W. Willier, Bender's UCC Service, Commercial Paper§ 16.01, at 
16-8 (1972) (emphasis in original); see S. Rep. No. 915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978). 
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generally should not be determined by reference to the relative electronic 
sophistication of the various payments systems. It is inappropriate to 
suggest that a payments system that operates without indispensable pa-
per should be governed primarily by consumer protection legislation, 
while the law governing paper-based transactions favors the interests of 
financial institutions. Distinctions should be drawn only on the basis of 
differences that matter, 107 and it is better if those "differences" are famil-
iar principles of established law. When the drafters of pervasive legisla-
tion identify and give effect to the essential elements of their subject 
matter, the drafters are better able to compose the type of "pre-emptive, 
systematic, and comprehensive enactment" envisioned by Professor 
Hawkland. 108 
The UNPC minimizes the legal effect of noncrucial distinctions be-
tween payments systems. Section 51, which defines both "draw" and 
"pay" orders, contains the primary example of the Draft's formulation of 
essential principles. 109 A draw order, such as a check, flows from a 
drawer to a payee and '1mll[s] credits back to the person entitled to pay-
ment in a direction opposite to the one in which the order is transmit-
ted."110 The UNPC comment to this section suggests that, in addition to 
the familiar check, a draw order may be electronic, such as "a prear-
ranged debit through a clearing house."111 The student of commercial 
paper is comfortable following the flow of warranties from endorsee to 
endorser/presenter to drawee, as payment of the item flows back in the 
opposite direction. 112 In the automated clearing house setting a prear-
ranged debit works similarly: A depositor of the "receiving" bank autho-
rizes a vendor to debit the depositor's account at the receiving bank; the 
vendor notifies its bank-the "originating" bank--of the preauthorized 
debit; the originating bank then credits the vendor's account for the ap-
propriate amount and forwards electronic advice of the transaction to the 
appropriate regional Automated Clearing House (ACH), which sends 
the advice on to the receiving bank, which debits the depositor's account. 
Just as in the check collection scenario, the order goes from debtor 
(drawer/depositor) to creditor (payee/vendor), and the creditor utilizes 
its bank (depositary/originating) to effect collection through a central-
ized medium (Federal Reserve Bank/ ACH) and charge the debtor's ac-
count institution (drawee/receiving bank). 113 
The pay order denomination also formulates the common characteris-
tics of different payments devices: "The order and the funds are pushed 
from the drawee to the payee, and the order and funds move in the same 
107. See 1983 Memorandum, supra note 13, at 1. 
108. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
109. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, §51. 
110. Jd. § 51 comment 1 on purpose and existing law (emphasis in original). 
111. Id. 
112. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417,4-207 {1977). 
113. See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 13-17. 
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direction." 114 Wire transfers and prearranged credit orders through an 
ACH are examples of pay orders. 115 Thus the drafters identified the low-
est common denominator in seemingly different systems and developed 
an analytical and definitional tool that emphasizes that common denomi-
nator while denying effect to insubstantial differences. 
IV. THE UNPC APPROACH TO STOP PAYMENT AND REVERSIBILITY 
The treatment of stop payment and reversibility in P.E.B. Draft No. 3 
of the UNPC116 offers a dynamic context in which to appraise the 
UNPC's jurisprudential perspective and to seek to identify the essential 
common denominators. The issues in this area have been around long 
enough to have come into sharp focus117 and the elements of the several 
payments devices are established. The commentators and the drafters of 
existing payments legislation have identified certain distinctions based on 
the reasons for the customer's exercise of a right to stop or reverse pay-
ment, the type of payment medium and the sophistication of the cus-
tomer. 118 The rules in force under current law represent the inconsistent 
conclusions reached as a result of the interaction of those transactional 
variables and the particular drafter's appraisal of cost119 and risk120 con-
siderations. The UNPC drafters would therefore have engaged in an 
analysis designed to yield state-of-the-art commercial law with respect to 
the right to stop and reverse payment. 
The two primary reasons for a customer's requesting a stop or reversal 
of payment are loss or theft of the payment device and dispute resolution. 
The overwhelming majority of stop payment requests in the familiar con-
text ofUCC "items"121 are issued by customers in response to the loss or 
theft of a check. Nevertheless, insofar as "the party in possession of the 
funds enjoys an edge in any dispute," 122 a customer may retain substan-
tial leverage by exercising a stop payment order. In virtually every in-
stance in which the stop payment of an item would be exercised, the right 
114. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 51 comment on purpose and existing law (emphasis in 
original). 
115. Id. 
116. For discussions of these issues in the context of the various payments systems. see 
Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 379-407; Nimmer, supra note 56, at 513-15, 524-34. 
117. For a description of the genesis of stop payment, see W. Holdsworth, supra note 
29, at 130-31. 
118. See, e.g., Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 366-78; Nimmer, supra note 56, at 488-
515; Scott II, supra note 15, at 782-92. See generally Chin, Electronic Fund Transfer: A 
Selected Bibliography, 13 U.S.F.L. Rev. 555 (1979) (references to materials involving 
EFf systems); Scott, Bibliography, 2 Computer L.J. 183 (1980) (same). 
119. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 367-69. 
120. Other considerations include: operational efficiency of financial institutions; costs 
to merchants; and the accommodation of users of the systems. !d. at 369-79. 
121. See U.C.C. § 4-104{l)(g) (1977). 
122. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 364. Retaining possession of the funds may be the 
only way a party can afford to force the payee into dispute resolution. !d. 
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is aleatory, dependent upon both fortuity 123 and, in the rare case, the 
sophistication of the drawer. 124 The drafters of the UNPC have recog-
nized the two distinct reasons customers abort payments and, for the 
most part, treat each separately. 
A. Liability as Drawer For Unauthorized Orders Under the UNPC 
A drawer may avoid liability for an "unauthorized order" 125 pursuant 
to the provisions of section 200 of the UNPC by issuing the appropriate 
notice of loss or theft to the "payor account institution." 126 The section 
encourages customers to notify the drawee to dishonor an order. A con-
sumer who fails to notify his account institution of loss or theft of an 
access device will be liable for the first fifty dollars (so long as the total 
loss is less than $500) whether or not his negligence contributed to the 
loss or theft. 127 This consumer liability ceiling is, as described, limited. 
In all other cases a drawer, consumer or otherwise, whose negligence 
"substantially contributed to the order becoming unauthorized," is pre-
cluded by section 202(2) from complaining that the order was unauthor-
ized. 128 Although negligence is left undefined, the UNPC drafters 
explained that "it should generally consist of actions which could be 
taken by the drawer to prevent the loss at a lower cost than the dis-
counted expectation of loss." 129 There is, then, a very clear incentive for 
drawers to issue an "unauthorized order" notice, like a loss or theft stop 
payment order, to avoid the expense of litigation and the vagaries of neg-
ligence analysis. Indeed, failure to notify an account institution of sus-
123. The issue is one of timing-whether the customer can exercise his right to stop 
payment before the check gets to the bank. The more quickly the check is "collected," 
the less time a customer has to stop payment. UCC § 4-403(1) (incorporating UCC § 4-
303(1)) provides that the stop payment order is untimely if the bank has accepted the 
item, paid the item in cash, settled for the item, or completed posting of the item. See 
u.c.c. §§ 4-303(1), 4-403(1) (1977). 
124. The payor bank would argue that under UCC § 4-407(a) it is not liable for wrong· 
ful payment over a stop payment order, because the drawer would have been liable in any 
case to the holder in due course of the item. An intermediary bank may be a holder in 
due course. To avoid that argument the sophisticated drawer can cross out "the order 
or• on his check. Without that language the check is not a negotiable instrument under 
UCC § 3-104(1)(d). Consequently there can be no holder in due course and the drawer is 
protected against the bank's § 4-407(a) claim. 
125. The UNPC defines an "unauthorized order" as "any order which is not author-
ized." U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 54(2). An order is "authorized" if it is initiated by the 
drawer or is initiated or paid with the drawer's authorization "and remains so unless . . . 
materially altered ... [or] transmitted without any necessary authorization, including, 
in the case of a written draw order, all valid endorsements." /d. § 54(1). 
126. /d. § 200(1). UNPC § 53(4) defines "payor account institution" as "the account 
institution which maintains the account directed to be debited by the drawer of an or· 
der." /d. § 53(4). The comments provide that the term is applicable to both pay and 
draw orders. /d. §53 comment 3; cf V.C.C. § 4-lOS(b) (1977) (Payor bank "means a 
bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted."). 
127. ld. § 200(2)(a). 
128. /d. § 202(2). 
129. /d. § 200 comment 3 on purposes. 
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pected or known loss or theft may very well constitute section 202(2) 
negligence. Article 4 of the UCC nowhere provides that failure to notify 
a drawee bank of the loss or theft of a check alone constitutes negligence 
that would permit the bank to charge the customer's account for the 
unauthorized order. 130 
Section 200 neither expressly provides that a bank may charge a cus-
tomer for issuing an unauthorized order notice nor precludes a bank 
from doing so.131 The provision does impose on banks costs that argua-
bly ought not to be passed on to all of a bank's customers without refer-
ence to whether an individual customer issues a notice. In any event, 
section 200 would be better drafted if the right to charge were either 
granted or denied expressly. 
Whether banks may, under current check law, charge a customer for 
exercising the right to stop payment was considered in two opinions of 
the Michigan Attorney General, whose position changed between April 
13, 198P32 and August 7, 1981.133 The April Opinion argued that to 
permit banks to charge a fee would sanction reallocation of risk in a man-
ner contrary to the scheme provided by the UCC. That position was, of 
course, naive. If banks were precluded from passing on the cost of a stop 
payment to a particular customer, they would endeavor to spread the 
cost over all customers. The August Opinion essentially repudiates the 
Attorney General's earlier remarks by focusing on the freedom of con-
tract sections of the UCC134 and deciding that customers may agree to 
pay a stop payment fee. The substance of that "agreement" was given 
only passing reference. The two opinions are, in reality, irreconcilable, 
and we may assume that the change of position resulted from the Attor-
ney General's Office coming to terms with economic realities. 
UNPC section 200, insofar as it concerns loss or theft of an order, is 
consistent with the better view concerning risk allocation in the unau-
thorized order context. "Those risks include liability to the customer for 
damages suffered as a result of bank negligence or error, and in other 
130. See U.C.C. § 4-406 (1978) 
131. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 200. UNPC § 425(13) provides that a bank "may 
require any person directing it to stop or reverse an order to pay any fees or charges for 
such service which it reasonably believes are necessary to cover the cost of providing the 
service." /d. § 425(13). By application of the construction principle of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), 2A C. Sands, 
Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction,§ 47.23, at 123 (4th ed. 1973), it could 
be argued that the drafters did not intend to sanction a bank charge for issuance of an 
authorized order notice, because§ 200 contains no language similiar to that in § 425(13). 
132. Op. Mich. Att'y Gen. No. 5867 (1981) (bank may not charge customer a fee on 
stop payment order), reprinted in 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1626 (1981). 
133. Op. Mich. Att'y Gen. No. 5947 (1981) (bank may contract \vith customer for fee 
on stop payment order), reprinted in 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1445 (1981). This 
opinion addressed the question of enforceability of an express contract between a bank 
and its customer in which the customer agrees to pay a fee in connection \vith a stop 
payment order. 
134. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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situations, liability to a third party claim that the stop payment was im-
proper."135 If an account institution fails to honor a proper unauthor-
ized-order notice, UNPC section 200 shifts the risk of loss on the 
instrument from the customer to the financial institution. This section 
departs from current check law by placing the crucial burden of proof on 
the account institution, which must show, "if the order is unauthorized 
. . . that the conditions for liability of the drawer . . . have been 
met." 136 Current check law provides that the drawer bears the burden of 
proof on the damages issue. 137 The second risk, that of a third-party 
claim, is inapposite in the section 200 context, in which the loss or theft 
of the payment medium is a prerequisite to application of the provision. 
If a third party asserts a claim that the unauthorized-order notice was 
improperly given effect, the issue is thrown out of section 200 and comes 
within the scope of section 425, which precludes stop payment with re-
gard to those media that have been issued by the account institution "in 
payment of its own underlying obligation."138 That language is intended 
to include "cashier's checks, bank drafts, 'teller's checks,' money orders, 
and certified checks." 139 Such media are also referred to as "remittance 
items." 140 
The basic scheme of section 200 works. The unitary approach, which 
subjects all nonremittance orders to the same legal rules, is successful in 
this context because choice among nonremittance items is not important 
here: No rational transactor would use any conceivable noncash pay-
ment medium and not prefer to limit its exposure in the event that the 
order is lost or stolen. It is therefore not difficult to establish a consis-
tent, acceptable rule for avoiding payment of unauthorized orders. In 
the terms of the NYCH analogy, 141 if a traveler loses his ticket, a single 
rule would work as well to minimize the loss whether the ticket was for 
passage by train, bus or airplane. 
UNPC section 200 illustrates that so long as important choice is not 
impaired, a comprehensive code can order the essential principles of 
commercial practice to improve the status quo. When meaningful choice 
is impaired and essential principles are not properly utilized as a founda-
tion, however, the aims of true codification are frustrated. The next por-
tion of the Article evaluates the most recent draft UNPC reversibility 
provision by reference to that jurisprudential perspective. 
B. Dispute Stop Payment and Reversibility under the UNPC 
Section 425 of the UNPC provides that a customer may stop or reverse 
135. Mittelsteadt, supra note 11, at 369 (citations omitted). 
136. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 200(3). 
137. u.c.c. § 4-403(3) (1977). 
138. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425(1). 
139. Id. § 425 comment 7 on purposes. 
140. !d. 
141. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. 
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payment of"authorized" orders142 to maintain leverage in a contract dis-
pute. 143 Does this section, as a matter of commercial code jurisprudence, 
represent the proper formulation of essential principles? If the drafters 
have not identified and made operative the correct bases for distinction, 
the product of their efforts will frustrate rather than serve the controlling 
objectives of commercial codification and preclude the enactment of a 
payments law that is truly pre-emptive, systematic and comprehensive. 
In addition to continuing the UCC rule of stop payment, UNPC sec-
tion 425 also provides consumer drawers a right to reverse an order of 
fifty dollars or more within three business days after the order h~ been 
"finally paid,"144 so long as the order was not for cash withdrawal or a 
check transmitted in paper form (in other words, not truncated), and the 
drawer has not waived the right to reverse orders drawn on the ac-
count. 145 Insofar as the section creates a sweeping consumer payment 
reversal right, it has attracted the displeasure of financial interests. 146 
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, would complain that any 
"right" that consumers may waive is ephemeral. 147 
The arguments against provision of a right to reverse payment focus 
on the burden that such provision would impose on payments systems. 
The UNPC section would provide consumers with a pervasive right: Pay 
as well as draw orders would be subject to reversal. 148 Nevertheless, the 
section cannot be criticized as eliminating all differences among the af-
fected payment media. Remittance orders, as well as the exceptions 
noted above, 149 provide transactors a form of "choice." But the con-
sumer's option to waive the reversal right will likely be a function of the 
choice of the merchant or financial institution, rather than that of the 
consumer. 
Although no distinct interest group has come rushing to the defense of 
section 425, there are cogent arguments in support of a right to reverse 
payment. The right now exists in the credit card context. ISO Moreover, 
many of the arguments in favor of providing a stop payment right are 
apposite in the reversal context, such as the policy of improving the bar-
142. For the definition of an "authorized order," see id. § 54(1). 
143. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 & commentl on purposes. 
144. See id. § 425(2). 
145. Id. 
146. See, e.g., NYCH Statement, supra note 10, at 18. 
147. In order to protect consumers some commentators maintain that stop payment or 
reversibility should be mandated for all EFT systems. See, e.g., Note. (h-ercoming the 
Obstacles to Implementation of Point-Of-Sale Electronic Fund Transfer Systems: EFTA 
and the New Uniform Payments Code, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1351, 1369 nn.84-85 (1983). 
148. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 comment 1 on purposes.) 
149. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. The point-of-sale systems in Mich-
igan and Wisconsin currently provide consumers a right to reverse payment. See Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann.§ 488.16 (West Supp. 1984-85); Wis. Admin. Code§ [Commissioner 
of Banking] 14.09 (1983). 
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gaining power of a drawer/buyer in a dispute with a payee/seller. 151 The 
right to reverse is a necessary adjunct to the stop payment right. Insofar 
as the right to stop payment is cut off after the order is paid, the provi-
sion of a right to reverse payment for three business days after final pay-
ment replaces the "stop payment window [that] may be appreciably 
shortened ... by check truncation [and the] use of on-line debit cards at 
the point-of-sale." 152 Also, in conjunction with three other UNPC provi-
sions, 153 section 425 avoids the pro-bank result currently guaranteed 
under vee sections 4-403 and 4-407 to payor collecting banks and payor 
banks by subrogation. 154 
Those who generally resist the provision of a right to reverse payment 
object particularly to section 425's formulation of the right. The objec-
tions raise important issues of commercial code jurisprudence and have 
been urged not only by those with vested interests in the health and wel-
fare of financial institutions, but also by those who are more impartial. 
Roland Brandel, a practicing attorney who has been quite active in the 
evolving law of new payments systems, 155 expressed his uneasiness with 
both the concept of reversibility and section 425 at the 1983 Uniform 
New Payments Code Invitational Conference. 156 He argued that the 
right to reverse fails on a basic fairness level because it gives consumers 
an absolute right to steal after making a simple phone call. Moreover, he 
argued that inasmuch as the expense of providing the right would ulti-
mately be shifted to consumers, 157 we should consider that cost before we 
decide that the provision of such a right is in the best interests of all 
consumers. Brandel believed that reversibility, to the extent ever desira-
ble, should be a matter of sales law, governed by vee article 2, rather 
than payments law. If considered within the Sales Article, reversibility 
could be treated more directly as a problem of dealing with recalcitrant 
merchants. Brandel would prefer that the problem be addressed by the 
use of consumer protection sanctions instead of burdening the payments 
system. Arguably, the financial institutions may not be the most eco-
nomically efficient segment of the commercial community to confront 
151. See U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 comment 1 on purposes. 
152. Id. § 425 comment 2 on purposes. 
153. /d. §§ 103, 426, 432. Section 103 outlines the rights of a funds claimant with or 
without limited due course rights. Section 426 deals with competing claims to an ac-
count. Section 432 provides a payor account institution's right to subrogation on im-
proper payment. 
154. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. 
155. See generally D. Baker & R. Brandel, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Sys-
tems (1983 Cum. Supp. to N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 1); R. Brandel, J. Ter-
raciano & B. Abbott, Truth in Lending Compliance Manual (2d ed. 1981); Brandel & 
Soloway, Consumer Financial Services, 38 Bus. Law. 1267 (1983); Brandel, Electronic 
Fund Transfers and the New Payments Code, 38 Bus. Law. 1355 (1983). Mr. Brandel is a 
partner with the San Francisco firm of Morrison & Foerster. 
156. R. Brandel, Remarks at the Uniform New Payments Code 1983 Invitational Con-
ference (Sept. 30, 1983) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). 
157. ld. 
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the problem of recalcitrant merchants. Indeed, Brandel suggested that 
small claims courts may provide the best means for consumers to vindi-
cate their rights. 158 
Brandel's criticism of section 42S's particular formulation of a reversal 
right is useful. He raises several fundamental questions. First, how does 
a consumer or payee know if there is a right to reverse the payment? If a 
check is used by a consumer drawer and truncated prior to its reaching 
the drawee, there is a right to reverse for three days after final payment of 
the item. 159 But if the paper check is not truncated prior to its reaching 
the drawee, there is no right to reverse. Also, insofar as a consumer will 
not know precisely when final payment has occurred, he will not know 
when the right has lapsed. Recall that this problem exists under current 
check law.160 Second, how does the payee know whether the account on 
which the check is drawn provides a right to reverse? Section 425 pro-
vides small comfort to the payee in that the comments suggest that "ac-
count institutions may specially identify orders drawn on consumer 
accounts for the convenience of persons taking such orders and for ac-
count institutions making availability determinations." 161 Finally, to 
what extent is the policy in favor of more immediate funds availability in 
diametric opposition to a reversal right? Recent legislative initiatives 
have suggested that there will be increasing pressure on financial institu-
tions to make funds available for withdrawal as of right as expeditiously 
as possible.162 UNPC section 421(2) provides that funds are not avail-
able as of right on consumer orders until three days from final payment 
have elapsed. 163 But even those banks that are currently willing to ex-
pose themselves to insufficient funds risks and permit customers to draw 
on uncollected funds may not be willing to increase that exposure by 
permitting withdrawal where there is the additional possibility of rever-
sal. An impartial study conducted by the National Commission on Elec-
tronic Fund Transfers (NCEFT) concluded that, in the context of point-
of-sale transactions, reversibility should not be required by legislation. tc..t 
The study noted that "the merchants most likely to accept EFT services 
158. Id. 
159. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425(2)(b). 
160. See U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (1977). 
161. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 425 comment 2 on purposes. 
162. See, e.g., 1983 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 234 (bill to establish reasonable time period v:ithm 
which bank must permit customers to draw on deposits); 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv., Ch. lOll 
(West) (bill to require that credit given by bank for item deposited becomes available to 
customer for withdrawal as of right); see also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1983, at 29, col. 6 
(discussing the New York legislation). 
163. U.N.P.C., supra note 3, § 421(2). 
164. EFf in the U.S., supra note 1, at 51. The National Commission on Electric Fund 
Transfers has 26 members drawn from the government. financial institutions and the 
public. The Commission was directed by Congress to "conduct a thorough study and 
investigation . . . and to recommend appropriate administrative action and legislation 
necessary in connection with the possible development of private and public EFf sys-
tems." Id. at iii. 
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are the large retailers who generally allow customers to return merchan-
dise within a reasonable period of time ... [whereas] [d]isreputable 
merchants are unlikely to accept EFT with required reversibility." 165 If 
all or nearly all payments media afford consumers a reversal right, con-
sumers would be denied meaningful choice. Although section 425 pro-
vides that consumers may waive the right to reverse, a waivable right 
may be of dubious value. Financial institutions could price the right in 
such a way as to preclude effectively its exercise, or merchants could 
refuse to accept media that give access to accounts providing a right to 
reverse. A waivable right to reverse, then, may do nothing to preserve 
real consumer choice. The UNPC drafters have failed to identify and 
utilize the correct essential principles and, therefore, have not formu-
lated an effective reversal provision in section 425. 
V. PROVISION OF A RIGHT TO REVERSE PAYMENT BY REFERENCE 
TO EsSENTIAL PRINCIPLES 
A reversal right drafted in a manner consistent with commercial code 
jurisprudence could overcome the Brandel and NCEFT reservations. 
Future drafts of a payments code should provide a right to reverse pay-
ments for a specified period only when a consumer uses a payment me-
dium that draws against a prearranged line of credit. 166 This 
recommendation would modify the P.E.B. Draft No. 3 provision by fo-
cusing on the cash/credit distinction, a crucial essential principle, and by 
serving rather than undermining transactor expectations. 167 Addition-
ally, even if the right is provided only in the credit context, real consumer 
choice would be maintained so long as the right cannot be waived. 
Although proposed section 425 draws distinctions among payments 
media to some extent, it does not distinguish in terms palatable to a good 
portion of the commercial community. This is a difficult area in which to 
establish meaningful differences that will prove tenable over the course of 
the development of new payments systems. For instance, while it may be 
desirable at the present time to encourage the development of point-of-
sale (POS) systems, a reversal right should not attach to that medium 
merely for the sake of better marketing that product. Marketing, to the 
extent of making distinctions to encourage the use of one payment device 
165. Id. at 51. 
166. In the event the UNPC is ultimately prepared as a statute regulating wholesale 
payment systems and leaves the provision of individual consumer rights to separate fed-
eral and state legislation, see supra note 21, the reversibility issue does not go away. 
Future adjustments of consumer protection law will need to come to terms with the right 
to reverse payment, which is already available in some retail payment systems. See supra 
notes 54-57, 150 and accompanying text. 
167. For a case that considers the importance of effectuating transactor expectations, 
see Santos v. First Nat'l State Bank, 186 N.J. Super. 52, 70, 451 A.2d 401, 410 (1982) 
("The [UCC's] ambiguities give us concern, as well as the realization that, because cash-
ier's checks are perceived by the public as cash-like, the [UCC] should be interpreted to 
limit the defenses that can be raised."). 
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over another, is not the province of a true commercial code. It may very 
well be that technology will develop a payments system more desirable 
than POS. "[I]t is a matter of vital importance that [a code] as a whole 
be kept in terms of such generality as to allow an easy and unstrained 
application of its provisions to new patterns of business behavior." 168 
Gilmore argued in favor of recognizing certain strategic strong 
points169 that could support a commercial code as business practices de-
veloped. The essential principles or strategic strong points identified 
ought to serve rather than frustrate the elusive goal of simplicity. 170 
The credit/cash difference is an essential principle-a crucial basis for 
distinction-that is certain to endure so long as selling money for "inter-
est" remains popular. The provision of a right to reverse payments only 
in the credit card context would be consistent with commercial code ju-
risprudence. Financial institutions could use the same familiar credit 
evaluation techniques now in use to screen applicants for credit cards 
and overdraft privileges, thereby further reducing the likelihood that the 
right to reverse would be exercised irresponsibly. From the drawee 
bank's viewpoint, reversibility would give rise to increased costs-per-
haps no greater and maybe less on a per item basis than those produced 
by the exercise of a stop payment right-which can be passed directly on 
to the consumer when the reversal right is exercised. For other banks in 
the chain of collection, the right to reverse would raise no more than the 
familiar funds availability issue. The financial community's provision of 
the right could be used in the give and take of a uniform payments code 
drafting process as a counterweight to consumers' lobbying for more ex-
peditious availability of credits for withdrawal. Moreover, depositary 
banks would continue to earn interest on the uncollected or not-yet-re-
versed funds. 
Permitting a right to reverse only in the credit context is consistent 
with commercial expectations and practical realities. Whether or not 
this right exists, a consumer who has drawn against a line of credit re-
mains in possession of the funds and the leverage that goes with posses-
sion. From the typical consumer's viewpoint, only the identity of the 
potential plaintiff changes. At the end of the provided reversal period the 
risk of nonpayment shifts from the merchant to the drawee financial in-
stitution, but the credit risk that remains is no more than the drawee 
bargained for when it issued the credit device and is therefore no longer 
pertinent to the reversal calculus. 
The proposal is also consistent with the needs identified by Professor 
168. Gilmore I, supra note 2, at 1355. Professor Gilmore also noted that 
"[c]ommercial codification cannot successfully overparticularize: the penalty for bcing 
too precise is that the statute will have to keep coming in for repairs (and amendment is a 
costly, cumbersome and unsatisfactory process) or else become a dead-letter." /d. 
169. See id. at 1358. 
170. See id. at 1356. 
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Scott, which are served by the codification of payments law. 171 
First, provision of an inalienable right to reverse when a line of credit 
is utilized guarantees real consumer protection controls on contract, 
which are uncertain if the right may be waived. Financial institutions 
benefit by charging interest when a payment medium draws on credit, 
and a right to reverse benefits the consumer. Although reversibility 
would burden the payments system, account institutions could be (and 
are under proposed section 425) permitted to charge a consumer for ex-
ercising the right. Also, insofar as credit access by use of payment media 
may increase impulse sales, reversibility is consistent with federal and 
state laws giving consumers a period of time after an "in-house" sale 
(usually of the door-to-door variety) in which to withdraw (reverse) the 
purchase commitment. If increased impulse sales are occasioned by 
more immediate access to credit, the same consumer protection policies 
served by statutory "cooling-off periods" in door-to-door sales may be 
effected by permitting reversibility. 
Second, the proposal will provide solutions to third party problems. 
Merchants and intermediary financial institutions are the affected third 
parties if reversibility of payments is permitted. The proposal provides 
law to govern those third party relationships, and may, in fact, supply 
that allocation of rights and duties for which the parties would bargain in 
the absence of prohibitive transaction costs. 172 If merchants could gain 
more from increased sales than they would lose from consumers' irre-
sponsible exercise of a right to reverse, merchants and consumers would 
agree to the provision of reversibility if they were able to contract on the 
issue. Financial institutions would contract with both merchants and 
consumers to permit reversibility if interest revenue exceeded the cost of 
providing the service. Under current law, national credit card services 
provide for reversibility, and consumers pay for that right in the form of 
interest. Although the proposal would not provide banks a right to dis-
count checks as they now do with credit card slips, it would permit banks 
to charge consumers for exercising the right to reverse, a charge for 
which current credit card law does not provide. 
Third, control of natural monopolies would be facilitated by the pro-
posal. Professor Scott offered the Visa and Master Card systems as ex-
171. See 1978 Report, supra note 14, at 31-47. See supra notes 79-93 and accompany-
ing text. 
172. Legal fees incurred in the course of negotiating a contract are an example of 
transaction costs. See W. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 631-32 
(4th ed. 1977). It may cost an individual consumer a small amount to find a merchant 
willing to permit reversal on a particular payments medium, but that small amount mul-
tiplied by all consumer purchases accomplished by the use of reversible media would 
prove burdensome. The proposal avoids that burdensome transaction cost. For a recent, 
if inconclusive, study of the effects of credit card use on retail sales, see Board of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Credit Cards in the U.S. Economy: Their Impact on Costs, 
Prices, and Retail Sales (1983). 
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amples of a natural monopoly. 173 By guaranteeing consumers a right to 
reverse and extending reversibility to payment devices other than na-
tional credit cards, the anti-competitive effects of such natural monopo-
lies are reduced. Under the proposal, any bank that offers overdraft 
protection would necessarily offer reversibility, thus giving the consumer 
greater choice in selecting a payment medium. The provision of an ina-
lienable statutory right to reverse also precludes natural monopolists 
from denying consumers the right that a truly competitive environment 
might provide. 
Fourth, because the proposed formulation would be mandatory, it may 
achieve even greater economies of scale in risk allocation than would 
result were the right to reverse waivable. Finally, it is inappropriate to 
have a merely supplemental (waivable) rule governing consumer revers-
ibility. Although Professor Scott recognized this in his 1978 Report, 174 
proposed section 425 ignores the argument against mere supplementa-
tion: "Any rules of merely supplemental nature, which are capable of 
being varied by private agreement, perform no service to the parties" to 
transactions achieving economies of scale, such as bank credit card trans-
actions or wire transfers. 175 The proposal of this Article, then, merely 
brings the reversibility provision in line with the policy of the fifth need 
by making the right to reverse mandatory in the credit context. 
CONCLUSION 
A UNPC should serve traditional and proven principles of commercial 
code jurisprudence in order to improve the current piecemeal legislation 
governing payments devices. While it is important that the drafters re-
main sensitive to the common characteristics and problems of diverse 
payments media, essential principles should be identified and utilized to 
preserve real choice for transactors. P.E.B. Draft No. 3 of the UNPC 
alternately succeeds (in the stop payment element of section 200) and 
fails (in the reversal provision of section 425) to formulate and utilize the 
correct essential principles. The argument here has suggested that, inas-
much as transactors are almost always more comfortable with the famil-
iar, the addition of a credit component to a payments device should 
determine the provision of a right to reverse. 
The 3-4-8 Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uni-
form Commercial Code may be expected to offer a fourth draft of the 
UNPC. Current credit card law suggests that a right to reverse is both 
commercially desirable and practical. This Article has urged that the 
right be maintained in future drafts of the UNPC but limited to the 
173. See 1978 Report, supra note 15, at 35-38. A "natural monopoly" results where 
one business of efficient size can produce all or more than the market can absorb at a 
remunerative price. /d.; see Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F.Supp. 373, 
377 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
174. 1978 Report, supra note 15, at 46. 
175. /d. at 45-46. 
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credit context. It is hoped that the architects of uniform and codified 
payments legislation will consider the jurisprudential arguments offered 
here in preparing the black-letter law of the next draft. 
